Mr Noseyman (Nosey) Pieterse, who emerged as a key figure behind the “strikes”, is mobilising for the next round of the “rural struggle” he claims to lead.
From years of experience, I know that when I am in a political pressure cooker, it is best to allow the heat to subside and some steam to escape before analysing what happened.
At the height of a crisis, when perceptions are sharply polarised, people aren’t prepared to question their pre-conceptions. They only see the “evidence” that supports their prejudices.
The recent “farm strikes” that shook the Western Cape for most of December and January (with a short Christmas break) was a case in point.
Let’s look at what really happened, not because the crisis is behind us, but because we are in a lull between storms. By all accounts, Mr Noseyman (Nosey) Pieterse, who emerged as a key figure behind the “strikes”, is mobilising for the next round of the “rural struggle” he claims to lead. Mr Pieterse wears several hats. He is simultaneously a farmer, the President of an association of BEE farmers in the wine and spirit industry, as well as a trade union leader, organising workers in the industry.
We should, in the weeks ahead, be prepared for the possibility of further rural “strikes”. In this context, it would help to have a better understanding of the crisis from which we have just emerged.
Before I begin, let me be clear: the life of a seasonal farm labourer is a very difficult one. Thousands of poverty stricken people come to the Western Cape from across Southern Africa (particularly Zimbabwe, Lesotho and the Eastern Cape) for the fruit-picking season, desperately seeking work in one of the few remaining sectors that employ unskilled labour. Many of these migrants have remained in the Province permanently and have set up “home” in shack settlements on the outskirts of rural towns. Unemployed for most of the year, they rely on the short fruit-picking season to earn some income, much of which disappears immediately into the coffers of loan sharks on whom they depend to keep their families alive. And as growing numbers of desperate work-seekers arrive, the competition intensifies between them for the shrinking number of jobs available, a result of the consolidation of farms and escalating mechanisation. As tough as it is to survive on the daily minimum wage, it is far tougher to earn nothing at all. And, as happens world-wide in situations of conflict over scarce resources, individuals band together in groups to protect and advance their interests. In divided societies, the fault line between groups is often determined by ethnicity. Here there are four distinct groups of seasonal work-seekers on the Province’s deciduous fruit and grape farms: Zimbabweans, Basotho, amaXhosa and traditional Western Cape farm workers, who would (in terms of the old apartheid designations) have been classified Coloured.
This is fertile ground for exploitation. And so it is easy to see how the dominant (but entirely misleading) narrative arose: “heartless white farmers and labour brokers make ‘super profits’ by using ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics to drive down workers’ wages as their lives deteriorate”.
It is easy to see how this narrative fuelled the anger and rage that led to the destruction of tens of millions of Rands worth of farm infrastructure (packing sheds, cooling stores, tractors, orchards and vineyards) in an orgy of violence lasting several weeks.
And one can discern the ANC’s interest in fuelling this narrative. It was a golden opportunity to drive a wedge between two strong sectors of DA support — farmers and farm workers – while seeking to position the DA on the side of “heartless farmers” and the ANC as the “champion of exploited workers”.
Unsurprisingly, this narrative was parroted by many observers, reinforcing stereotypes and creating conditions conducive to disinvestment and job losses in a sector that is the backbone of the Western Cape’s economy.
Except that the truth was the exact opposite.
I have rarely come across a case study that so graphically illustrates the disjuncture between perception and reality.
Some of the key facts (that explode this narrative) are as follows:
In fact, the best option available for unskilled, seasonal farm workers in South Africa is to secure a job with a farmer like Pierre Smit, who is not a rare exception in the Western Cape. In fact, research by Ben Stanwix of UCT’s Development Policy Unit shows that on average farmers pay significantly higher wages in the Western Cape than other provinces. This is one of the reasons why tens of thousands of desperately poor people leave their homes in far more fertile regions across Southern Africa to seek work on the rocky mountain slopes of De Doorns and other farms in the Western Cape.
Irony number one: while the ANC was slamming “heartless white farmers”, many of them were actually paying their workers more than the minimum wage that had been set by the ANC Minister of Labour, Mildred Oliphant, in consultation with COSATU.
Irony number two: When the workers went on strike in protest, and the ANC was slamming labour brokers for playing a role in the exploitation of workers, a former ANC councillor, Nelie Barends, who is also a labour broker, tried to provide the BEE farming consortium that took over Keurboschkloof farm with scab labour. In fact, throughout the period that the ANC was slamming labour brokers’ in the Hex River Valley, their own members (including ANC councillor Pat Marran and his wife) were playing a key role as brokers supplying seasonal labour to farms.
Irony number three: as the ANC, Passop, FAWU and Nosey Pieterse claimed to be representing the interest of the workers they were actually at war with each other, a conflict which seriously jeopardised worker interests, causing serious divisions and infighting between different groups of workers, usually divided on an ethnic basis. But they all shared one common goal: to convince workers that their “war” was actually with the farmers. All the while, ANC politicians sought to spread the unrest across the province for their political advantage.
Irony number four: While the ANC accused farmers of fanning xenophobia, it has actually been driven by labour brokers representing differing groups of workers, and exploiting the fault lines caused by ANC policy. While Zimbabweans were legalised through a special amnesty of the Department of Home Affairs (with the support of the farmers), workers from Lesotho were excluded from the amnesty and their employment was deemed illegal and penalised through heavy fines. This meant that thousands of Basotho who had been previously employed, were now unemployed due to ANC policies, while the ANC sought to fan and exploit their anger to spread the unrest.
Irony number five: While the ANC claims to be against labour brokers, it was the farmers, together with the Zimbabwean workers who really fought to get rid of these broker intermediaries. The Zimbabweans, in particular, resisted a consortium or labour brokers (including those with ANC links) who sought to extract from farmers R10 per day for every worker the brokers placed in a job. Zimbabweans wanted to contract directly with farmers, without an intermediary role of labour brokers. This was vehemently opposed by the labour brokers, dominated by ANC public representatives, who were determined to defend the “super profits” they earned from placing workers.
Irony number six: The ANC and its various allied organisations, were happy to drive the conflict between the Basotho, Zimbabweans, and local labour to extend the unrest throughout rural areas, in their attempts to present the Western Cape as being exploitative, racist, and ungovernable.
Why should anyone believe me? Go and read the primary academic research such as Ben Stanwix’s article “Minimum wages and compliance in South African agriculture” as well as a discussion document by Jan Theron (co-ordinator of the Labour and Enterprise Policy Research Group at UCT) titled “Changing employment trends on farms in the Hex and Breede River valleys” and the research paper “Violence, Labour and the Displacement of Zimbabweans in De Doorns, Western Cape” written by Jean Pierre Misago of the University of the Witwatersrand’s Forced Migration Studies Programme that contain some in-depth interviews on this matter (over and above my direct discussions with farm workers and farmers).
The best of all of these is an article titled “Oogsten in Afrika” published in the magazine Quote in October 2012, which quotes Anton de Vries, the Dutch co-founder of the BEE consortium that took over Keurboschkloof farm (that cut worker wages as soon as they took over) saying he had set up a venture to “profit” from land reform. He boasted that it was an official partner of the ANC national government and has contacts in the highest levels, which is its greatest asset.
It is time we woke up and saw what is really happening in our platteland, instead of continuing to bow before the ANC’s warped and deliberately distorted version of events.
The reality is that while most farmers pay significantly higher than the minimum wage they are struggling to make ends meet because of the low return on their product. For example, a “Capturing Gains” research project revealed that when it comes to the final retail price for table grapes from Hex River Valley imported to the United Kingdom, 42% goes to supermarkets, 32% to distributors, while only 18% is retained by the farmers, who must cover all their costs from this return.
Instead, of falling prey to the ANC’s ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics, farmers, farm workers, civil society and government need to work together to address this highly distorted value chain and increase profitability on farms so that the individuals putting in the hard work start reaping the benefits.
By Helen Zille, Leader of the Democratic Alliance – 17 March 2013